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This paper generalizes the Grossman-Helpman political economy model to 
characterize the structure of  environmental and industry protection for a small open 
economy when domestic and/or trade policies are the outcome of  a noncooperative 
common agency game between sector-specific producer lobbies and the government.  For 
a consumption externality, the political equilibrium results if  domestic and trade policies 
are available, are production-enhancing protection of  organized industries, but the same 
environmental protection as Pigouvian taxes.  Subsidies to organized industries 
counterbalance environmental taxes when there is a production externality, and it is 
ambiguous whether domestic or trade policy alone leads to more environmental 
protection.  In addition, this paper demonstrates that the original Grossman-Helpman 
results arise as a special case that rests on the assumption that only trade policies are 
available to the government. Environmental Protection with Policies for Sale 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades trade and environment policy issues have gained 
considerable attention.  The traditional approach to analyzing environmental policy-
making has encompassed a benevolent government choosing instruments and their levels 
to maximize a social welfare function that includes the costs and benefits of  the 
environmental externality (Markusen 1975, Baumol and Oates 1988, Krutilla 1991, Diao 
and Roe 1995).  In these models, Pigouvian taxes directly linked to the source of  the 
externality emerge as the optimal solution.  Trade policies, such as import tariffs, lead to 
deadweight losses and less environmental protection, so they are generally inferior to 
direct interventions such as effluent fees, input and output, or consumption taxes, 
depending on the cause of  the market failure. 
The distinction between trade and environmental policies has not been so clear in 
the political arena.  While optimal domestic and trade policies can be conceptualized, as 
Anderson and Blackhurst (1992, p. 20) have noted, the trade and environment area has 
"an above-average risk of  being exploited by special-interest groups to their own benefit 
and at the expense of  the general interest."  Negotiations such as the Uruguay Round of 
GATT (1986-1993) have spurred lively discussions about trade and the environment in 
this context.  Conversely, trade policy can conflict with environmental objectives:  A 
well-known recent case involves u.s. production of  sugar in Florida, which has been 
stimulated by protective import quotas, while at the same time state and national 
legislators have considered imposition of  an output tax to reduce its devastating effects on 
the Everglades. The above observations suggest that domestic and trade policies affecting 
environmental quality should be regarded as the simultaneous outcomes of  a political 
process, and should be analyzed in a political economy framework.  While the positive 
theory of  policy-making has frequently been applied in international trade, there are only 
a few attempts that account for environmental concerns.)  Among such formal political 
economy models is one developed by Hillman and Ursprung (1992).  They analyze the 
impact of  environmental interest groups on trade policies in a model of  political 
competition in which candidates accept contributions to influence their chances of  getting 
elected.  Most other studies on the political economy of  trade and the environment are 
descriptive (Hoekman and Leidy 1992, Klepper 1992).  Both the positive political 
economy models and the empirical analyses are helpful in determining when welfare-
enhancing trade and environmental policy reforms, as studied by Copeland (1994), 
Copeland and Taylor (1994, 1995), or Beghin, Roland-Holst, van der Mensbrugghe and 
Metcalfe (1996), are politically feasible. 
This paper takes an additional step in the direction of  positive analysis of  the 
policy outcomes when environmental externalities exist and organized interest groups 
lobby the government for political favors.  The analysis presented herein builds on the 
political economy model developed recently by Grossman and Helpman (1994), in which 
the structure of  protection for a small open economy facing fixed world prices is derived 
under the assumptions that the government has only trade policies available and that 
owners of  some sector-specific factors are represented by industry lobbies. 
I For a recent overview on the political economy of  trade policy see Rodrik (1995). 
2 In the Grossman-Helpman political economy model, and its extension herein, the 
lobbies offer contributions to the government contingent on the levels of  its policy 
decisions.  Contributions are not primarily aimed at affecting the outcome of  elections but 
rather to influence the government's policy stance.  The government is assumed to 
maximize a weighted sum of  the total contributions it receives and total consumer 
welfare.  The lobbies' and the government's decisions are modeled as a first-price menu 
auction in a noncooperative common agency game with complete information, as 
developed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986).  The government is the common agent 
whose actions are the policies, while each lobby is a principal whose bids are its 
contributions.  Expressions for the equilibrium levels of  policy interventions are derived 
assuming that preferences are quasilinear and identical across all individuals, that the 
contribution schedules are differentiable around the equilibrium point, and that the 
equilibrium is interior. 
Two extensions of  the basic Grossman-Helpman model are developed to address 
trade and environment political economy in this paper.  First, it is assumed that 
consumption or production of  one (or more) industry outputs generates a negative 
externality.  Second, because the environmental externality naturally raises the question 
of  optimal choice of  policy instruments, it is assumed that domestic and/or trade policies 
may be available to the government.  The domestic policies are either consumption or 
production taxes and subsidies, while the trade policies are taxes and subsidies on imports 
and exports.  Extension of  the model to allow choice among domestic and trade policies 
in the presence of  externalities builds on results with multiple policy alternatives 
developed recently in Dixit (1996) and Schleich and Orden (1996): these extensions 
3 demonstrate that the Grossman-Helpman political equilibrium results are special cases 
that test on the assumption that only trade policies are available to the government.  For 
simplicity, it is assumed herein that the environmental externality is generated by the 
consumption or production activity itself, not by a particular input or production process. 
Hence, taxing consumption or production is equivalent to taxing the source of  the 
externality, and such taxes provide the optimal policies to address the two externalities in 
a standard normative model. 
The trade and environment political economy model developed herein retains the 
initial Grossman-Helpman assumption that only owners of  some sector-specific factors 
are organized to lobby.  The externalities are assumed to directly affect consumer well-
being, and consumers are all assumed to care about the environment, but environmental 
interests are not organized.  Since the government cares about total welfare and--via their 
contributions--especially about lobby members' welfare, environmental concerns are 
reflected in the government's objective function. 
2 
Given the assumed structure of  the political economy model, the equilibrium 
policies can be expressed as the sum of  distinct political support and environmental 
effects.  Whether these effects reinforce or counterbalance each other depends on the 
nature of  the externality, whether the industry is organized, and whether the good is 
exported or imported. 
2 Assuming that the government cares about the environment although environmental interest groups are 
not organized can be justified by the high political profile of  environmental issues that is found in public 
opinion polls. Congleton (1996, p. 25), for example, finds that there is sufficient statistical evidence to 
conclude that general voter interests are not entirely neglected in environmental policy making. 
4 Consumption policy alone, which does not affect producer prices in a small open 
economy, fails to give the government an instrument to satisfy industry lobbies.  Hence, 
in the case of  a consumption externality, the political equilibrium policy are standard 
Pigouvian consumption taxes when only consumption policy is available.  If  trade or 
production policy is also available, the political equilibrium interventions by the 
government are production-enhancing protection for organized industries, combined with 
consumer price policies that result in the same level of  environmental quality as the 
Pigouvian taxes.  This is not the outcome for a production externality because the 
domestic production policy not only serves the government to address the externality but-
-unlike the consumption policy--also to satisfy the lobbies.  If  a polluting industry is 
organized, environmental protection is lower than under a Pigouvian output tax. 
An important finding of  the analysis is that it is generally ambiguous whether 
domestic policy alone or trade policy alone leads to higher environmental protection, 
when the government is restricted to use only one or the other.  This result is 
demonstrated for the case of  a negative production externality.  Using a production 
subsidy incurs a lower deadweight loss than using a trade policy (an import tariff or an 
export subsidy) for any given level o/protection for an organized industry.  Conversely, 
using a production tax generates a lower deadweight loss than a trade policy (an import 
subsidy or export tax) for any given level o/the externality. The net outcome from use of 
only production policy, compared to use of  only trade policy, depends on the relative 
magnitudes of  the political support and environmental effects on the political equilibrium 
policies. 
5 The remainder of  the paper is organized as follows.  The next section develops the 
methodology and derives the political equilibrium levels of  domestic and trade policies 
for a small open economy when an externality is generated by consumption.  Then the 
results are derived for a production externality.  For both cases, results are compared 
when the government has both domestic and trade policies available or is restricted to 
only one policy. 
II.  CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITY 
1.  Producers 
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), assume there are (n + 1) goods in a 
small open economy.  World and domestic prices for the numeraire good 0 are equal to 
one, and the vector of  world prices for all nonnumeraire goods, pW = (pt  ,p;  ,  ..... ,p;), is 
exogenous and constant.  The numeraire good is made from labor alone, such that one 
unit of  labor produces one unit of  output.  Thus, the wage rate for the entire economy is 
equal to one.  The other goods are produced from labor and one inelastically supplied 
specific input, with constant returns to scale in both factors but diminishing returns to 
labor.  This production structure leads to (aggregate) quasi  -rents of  I1j( p; )  to the specific 
factor in industry i that only depend on the output price received by producers p;' . 
Hotelling's Lemma provides the supply of  industry i, Xj(p;') =  I1;(p;) , and 
::  =  X:  > O.  Owners of  the specific factor used in the production of  good i have an 
incentive to lobby for policies that raise p;  because a higher price increases their rents. 
6 An exogenously determined subset L of  all owners of  specific factors are assumed to be 
organized to lobby by making contributions to the government. 
2.  Consumers 
The population ofN residents in the home country provide a total labor supply I 
and have identical, additively separable quasi-linear preferences.  Each individual j 
11 
maximizes  u i  =  CO}  + L  Uti (Co) + U  E} (E) , where COj  is the consumption of  the numeraire 
;=1 
good, cij is the consumption of  good i by individual j, and uE } (E) is the utility that 
individual j derives from the state of  the environment as determined by an externality E. 
All  Uti (.  ) are assumed to be increasing and concave functions, and, for specificity, it is 
t3u E , 
assumed that the externality is negative, that is --.I  = u~} < 0 (the analysis holds 
t3E 
equally well if  the externality is positive). 
The externality E is generated, for each individual j, by the consumption of  one or 
more of  the nonnumeraire goods by all other individuals k.  Assume that an 
N 
environmental externality created by consumption of  some good e is simply E = L  C ek  • 
k=1 
k*} 
When an individual decides on her level of  consumption of  good e, she does not take into 
account the effects of  her decision on other individuals' utility.  Since all individuals' 
preferences are identical, the subscripts for the consumers can be dropped.  Thus, 
N  t3E 
E = LCek  =(N -l)ce , with -=  E' =(N  -1). 
k=1  tXe 
k*.i 
7 The consumer price vector is denoted pd= (p~  ,p~  ,  .....  'P/~).  The quasi-linear 
preferences lead to ordinary demand functions that depend only on their own prices 
dj( P;) and all individuals have the same marginal utility of  income equal to one.  An 
individual's indirect utility can be expressed as v(pd, y, E) = Y +  S(Pd) + uE(E), where y 
n  n 
represents her income, and s(p d)  =  L uJ  d  i (p 1  )]  -L  p 1  d i (p 1)  is her consumer 
i=1  i=1 
surplus from nonnumeraire goods.  Individual demands are derived from Roy's Identity, 
d; (p1) = - ad  ,and total domestic demand for any good i in the economy is 
t1J; 
3.  Government 
The government is assumed to maximize a weighted sum of monetary 
contributions from organized industries and total consumer welfare.  To do so, it can 
impose ad valorem consumption policies 'tj and trade policies OJ on any of  the 
nonnumeraire goods.  The consumption policies drive a wedge between the prices that 
consumers and producers face, and the trade policies separate domestic producer and 
world prices.  The price equilibrium conditions for the supply and demand of  good i are 
Pi'  = B;pr and p1  = r/};pr·  A consumption tax implies 'tj >  1, while a consumption 
subsidy requires 'tj<  I.  An import tariff or an export subsidy implies OJ> 1, while an 
import subsidy or an export tax requires 8j<l, depending on whether good i is imported 
or exported. 
8 The net revenue of  the government (excluding contributions by lobbies) is 
generated by its domestic and trade policies.  Proceeds are derived from consumption and 
export taxes and from import tariffs, while expenditures are made for consumption, 
import, and export subsidies.  The use of  differentiated lump-sum taxes or subsidies as an 
independent policy instrument is ruled out by assumption, but the government's net 
revenue is redistributed evenly on a per-capita basis.  The policy vector (t, 8) generates 
net per-capita transfers 
(1)  r(B,r) =  ~tp:'(ri-l)Di(P;)+  ~tPiW(Bi-l)[Di(P;)-Xi(P;\')]' 
i=1  i=1 
Contributions received by the government from organized interest groups are not 
part of  the per-capita transfer (1).  Instead, as Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1996, p.16) 
explain, "they might be used by the governing party for its reelection campaign, or by a 
governing dictator for his own consumption."  Contributions do not enter the subsequent 
market equilibrium conditions of  the model, except to imply a decrease in income of 
owners of  the sector-specific factors utilized in organized industries.  The government is 
assumed to be concerned about total welfare as well as contributions either because 
consumer well-being also influences its chances for reelection or for (unspecified) ethical 
reasons. 
4.  Equilibrium 
In the first stage of  the two-stage noncooperative game, lobbies simultaneously 
and noncooperatively set their contribution schedules as functions of  domestic and trade 
policies Cj (t,8).  In the second stage, the government chooses 't and 8 simultaneously. 
9 Starting with the second stage, the government is assumed to maximize the 
weighted sum of  total contributions and total consumer welfare W( r,  0) 
where the coefficient a captures the trade-off between contributions and total consumer 
welfare as perceived by the government.  Total consumer welfare consists of  the sum of 
total labor income, total profits, net government revenue, total consumer surplus, and the 
total utility derived from environmental quality.  Thus 
n 
(3)  W(r,O) =1 +  ~)Ij(pi') + Nr(r,O) + NS(pd) + NU E (E) 
n 
=1 + ITIj(pi') + Nr(r,O) + NS(pd) + NU E «N -l)ce ) 
i=1 
In the first stage of  the game, each lobby i chooses its contribution schedule to 
maximize the (aggregate) net welfare of  its members 
where Nj is the number of  people that own factor i and Ii is their (aggregate) labor 
income.  Necessary conditions for a subgame-perfect equilibrium, which consists of  a set 
of  contribution functions {Cjo} jeL and policy vectors 'to and eO, are
3 
i)  CjO is feasible for all iEL, 
that is, contribution schedules must not be negative and cannot exceed aggregate 
income of  each lobby; 
3 See Proposition 1 in Grossman and Helpman (1994) for all necessary and sufficient conditions. 
10 ii)  (T° ,0°) maximizes (2), 
that is, given the lobbies' contribution schedules, the equilibrium policies must 
maximize the government's objective function; and 
iii)  ('to ,0°) maximizes 
(5)  W;(T,O)-Cio(T,O)+ LjELC~(T,O)+aW(T,O), foralli E  L, 
that is, the equilibrium policies must maximize the sum of  any lobby i's net welfare 
and the government's objective function, given the payments of  all other lobbies. 
If  condition (iii) was violated for any lobby i, it could modify its contribution schedule so 
that the government selected a more favorable policy vector and the surplus from such a 
switch could be shared by the lobby and the government.  Thus, a policy that violates (iii) 
could not have been an equilibrium. 
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), assume that the equilibrium is interior and 
that contribution schedules are differentiable around the equilibrium point.  Taking the 
first-order conditions for (2) and (5), and combining terms yields 
(6)  V pC?( T° ,0°)  ==  V pW;( T° ,0°), for  ~  == 't, 0 and for all i E  L. 
The operator V denotes the gradient vector ofthe partial derivative with respect to the  ~. 
Equation (6) requires that the marginal change in payments to the government for 
a small change in the policy vector has to equal the marginal change in lobby i's gross 
welfare.  In other words, the shapes of  the contribution schedules reveal the lobbies' true 
11 preferences around the equilibrium point; the contribution schedules are locally truthful.
4 
In particular, since E enters the individual utility functions of  members of  any lobby, the 
effects of  a change in the policy variables 't and 8 on the quality of  the environment are 
taken into account by all lobbies. 
Summing equation (6) over the lobbies and substituting into the first-order 
condition of  the government's objective function (2) yields 
Equation (7) is the first-order condition for maximizing the sum of  the lobbies' net 
welfare and the government's objective.  Using equations (1), (3) and (4), together with 
Hotelling's and Roy's rules, then collecting terms, the first-order conditions (7) for the 
equilibrium interventions in industry i are 
(8a) 
(8b)  (0. -1) = _ (liL  - a L)  Xi  -(1'. -1) P; D:  _ 8 TiD:u~(N  -1) 
,  (  )  wM'  ,  wM'  wM"  a + a L  Pi  i  Pi  i  Pi  i 
4 Local truthfulness suffices to characterize the structure of  protection.  Since this game in principle has 
multiple Nash-equilibria, one has to be selected to determine lobbies' payments in equilibrium.  Grossman 
and Helpman (1994) choose the truthful equilibrium, in which contribution schedules correctly reflect the 
lobbies' preferences globally, not just around the equilibrium point.  In the truthful equilibrium, each lobby 
pays to the government for any policy vector (t,e) the excess of  lobby i's gross welfare at (t,e) relative to 
some base level of  welfare (Grossman and Helpman 1994, p. 840).  A truthful equilibrium may be focal 
among the set of  Nash equilibria for two reasons: (1) it is coalition-proof, that is it is stable to nonbinding 
communication among the lobbies, and (2) it is efficient for the strategic players, that is, given the 
available policy instruments no feasible Pareto superior outcome exists for the government and the 
organized interest groups (for discussion, see Bernheim and Whinston, for quasilinear preference, and 
Dixit, Grossman and Helpman, for more general preferences).  In the Grossman-Helpman political 
economy model, since total welfare appears in the government's objective function, efficient choices are 
made at the truthful equilibrium not just for the strategic players but for the entire polity (see Corollary 2 to 
proposition 5 in Dixit, Grossman and Helpman). 
12 where  M;' = TjD;' - X;' < 0 is the derivative of  domestic import demand, and 
a L  = L N
j  ~  1 is the exogenous share of  the population that owns specific factors in 
jeL  N 
organized industries.  The 0 and IiL are indicator variables:  0=1 if  consumption creates 
an externality, that is for i=e, and 0 =0 otherwise; IiL = 1 if  industry i is organized and IiL =0 
otherwise. 
The system of equations (8) simultaneously determines the political equilibrium 
domestic and trade policies for industry i 
where & X;.Pi'  is the elasticity of  domestic output supply. 
When consumption and trade policies are both available to the government, the 
political equilibrium for each good involves the use of  two policy interventions (whether 
or not the good generates a consumption externality).  In a small open economy, 
consumption policies cannot affect domestic producer prices.  Thus, trade policy is 
applied to satisfy organized interest groups.  The equilibrium trade policy (9b) has only a 
political support term, and will be a favorable import tariff or export subsidy if  the 
industry is organized.  The equilibrium trade policy will be an unfavorable import 
subsidy or export tax if  the industry is not organized. 
For goods that do not generate an externality, the effect of  the trade policy on the 
domestic producer price will be exactly offset by the equilibrium consumption policy 
13 (other than having opposite signs, the expressions for the political support terms in (9a) 
and (9b) differ only because the ad valorem policies are expressed in relation to different 
base prices).  Thus, when there is no externality, domestic consumer prices are restored to 
world levels.  The political equilibrium consumption policy is applied to eliminate 
deadweight consumer surplus losses that would otherwise result from the equilibrium 
trade interventions. 
The political equilibrium consumption policy for any good e which generates an 
externality decomposes into a political support effect, the first term on the RHS of  (9a), 
and an additional environmental effect (the second term).  The environmental effect 
captures the social costs of  an additional unit of  consumption of  good e, and requires a 
consumption tax.  It coincides with the standard Pigouvian tax when the political support 
effect is zero.  Thus, the standard Pigouvian tax can be obtained as the political 
equilibrium policy when either the government weighs total welfare infinitely high 
(a~<Xl), the entire eco~omy  is organized (a L  =  1 =  Iii  Vi), nobody is organized 
(a  L  = 0 = Iii  V i) , or the elasticity of  domestic output supply is infinite (& x'  ~  <Xl). 
i,Pi 
Aside from these extreme cases, the political support effect on trade policy, and 
hence on protection for an organized industry, is inversely related to a, also to a.L, since 
members of  all other organized industries (as consumers) will bid against protection of 
any given sector, and finally to  & x  .,  reflecting the deadweight loss associated with the 
c,Pe 
interventions (Ramsey pricing).  Whether the political equilibrium consumption policy 
for good e is a subsidy (T  e -1 < 0) or a tax (T  e -1 > 0) depends on the signs and relative 
magnitudes of  the political support and environmental effects.  When industry e is 
14 organized, the political support effect requires a subsidy, which will be counterbalanced 
by an environmental tax to determine the net policy outcome.  When industry e is not 
organized, the political support and environmental effects have the same sign, both 
calling for a consumption tax  . 
. Taking the effects of  the government's trade and consumption policies together, 
the domestic consumer price always differs from the world price by the Pigouvian tax. 
Thus, for a small open economy, the political equilibrium policies in the presence of  a 
consumption externality lead to the same domestic consumer prices, and hence to the 
same level of  the externality, as the results from a standard normative analysis.  In the 
political equilibrium, however, organized domestic industries are protected, and more of 
their outputs are produced within the country than is optimal in a normative model. 
Now consider the case when only consumption policy is available to the 
government of  a small open economy.  In this case, the government has no instrument to 
address the special interests of  industry lobbies.  Setting the ad valorem trade policy equal 
to one in equation (8a), the equilibrium consumption policy when there is an externality 
is just the Pigouvian tax.s 
Setting the ad valorem consumption policy equal to one in equation (8b) yields 
the equilibrium interventions when the government is limited to the use of  trade policy 
5 Pigouvian taxes are not the equilibrium policies for a closed economy in which the government has only 
consumption policy available.  In a closed economy, consumption policies affect producer prices.  It can be 
shown that the political equilibrium consumption policies have the same structure as equation (9a).  The 
equilibrium levels of  intervention, however, are generally different than for a small open economy since 
there are no offsetting tariffs for the closed economy and the expressions are evaluated at different points. 
15 The first term on the RHS of  (10) is the political support effect.  It is identical to the 
equilibrium policy expression derived by Grossman and Helpman (1994), and requires an 
import tariff or an export subsidy when an industry is organized and an import subsidy or 
an export tax if  it is not organized (for the remainder of  the paper, the discussion will 
focus on the outcomes for the organized industries). 
When only trade policies are available, the political support term in equation (10) 
differs from the political support term in the equilibrium trade policy equation (9b), for 
the case when both consumption and trade policies are available to the government.  The 
difference arises because the Grossman-Helpman political support effect has consumption 
and production impacts, and therefore depends on the slope of  domestic import demand. 
The political support effect in equation (9b) reflects only production impacts, and 
depends on the slope of  just domestic supply.  Thus, the Grossman-Helpman political 
equilibrium results are a special case that rests on the assumption that the government can 
only use trade policy. 
6 
The equilibrium intervention also includes an additional environmental effect 
when only trade policy is available to the government and there is an externality.  The 
environmental effect calls for an import tariff or an export subsidy, since either reduces 
domestic consumption of  good e.  Thus, the political support and environmental effects 
reinforce each other for organized industries.
7 
6 See Dixit and Schleich and Orden for further discussion of  multiple policy instruments in the Grossman-
Helpman model. 
7 The fonnal result supports the potential observation that industries will claim protection in the name of 
maintaining the quality of  the environment, although such "claims" play no role in the model herein. 
VanGrasstek (1992) provides empirical support that politicians are willing to implement protectionist trade 
policies in the name of  environmental protection. 
16 III.  PRODUCTION EXTERNALITY 
Suppose that the production of  nonnumeraire good e generates an externality such 
that  oE  = E I  >  O.  Again, assume that the externality negatively affects the well-being 
oXe 
of  all consumers, so  u~ < 0 . 
As before, individual consumers make their consumption decisions taking E as 
glven.  When lobbies set their contribution schedules, they again take into account how 
the government's interventions affect their members' welfare through impacts on E. 
Now, assume the government can impose ad valorem production policies 'tj and 
trade policies 8j on any of  the nonnumeraire goods.  The production policies drive a 
wedge between the prices domestic producers and consumers face, and the trade policies 
separate domestic consumer and world prices.  Supply and demand price equilibria for 
good i require Pi' = B;  pt  and p; = 8j p;w respectively.  A production tax implies 'tj > 1, 
'; 
while a production subsidy requires 'tj < 1.  An import tariff or an export subsidy implies 
8j > 1, while an import subsidy or an export tax requires 8j < 1.  The net per-capita 
transfer by the government is 
n  n 
(11)  r("B) =  ~LPi'(,; -l)X;(p;')+t  LP;W(B; -l)[D;(p;)-X;(p;')]. 
;=1  ;=1 
Using the same approach as before, the first-order conditions for the equilibrium 
interventions in industry i are 
17 where now the derivative of  domestic import demand is M; = D; -)(  . 
The two first-order conditions (12) simultaneously determine the political 
equilibrium production and trade policies for industry i 
(13b)  (B; -1) =0. 
In the political equilibrium, it is not optimal for the government to apply trade 
policies when production policies are available.  Production policies are more efficient 
than trade policies for addressing both organized industries' interests and the production 
externality because trade policies also distort consumption.  Equations (13a) and (13b) 
demonstrate again (very clearly) that the original Grossman-Helpman (1994) results for 
the equilibrium trade interventions are a special case that depends on the restriction that 
only trade policy is available to the government. 
If  an industry is organized, the political support effect in equation (13a) is 
negative and requires a production subsidy.  The political support effect in equation (13a) 
is the same as the political support effect on consumption policy in equation (9a).  For a 
small open economy, a production subsidy alone, or trade protection (import tariff or 
export subsidy) together with a consumption subsidy, result in the same equilibrium 
18 domestic producer and consumer price levels for all goods that do not create an 
externality. 
8 
When there is a production externality, the second term on the RHS of  (13a) 
captures an additional environmental effect.  It is positive, requiring a production tax, 
and~-without  the minus sign--reflects the negative social effects of  an additional unit of 
production.  When industry e is organized, whether the political equilibrium production 
policy is a subsidy (T e -1 < 0) or a tax (T e -1 > 0) depends on the magnitudes of  the 
political support and environmental effects.  When the political support effect is zero, the 
production policy consists only of  the environmental effect, which then coincides with 
the standard Pigouvian tax for a production externality. 
The results for the case where the government has only production policy 
available are derived by setting the ad valorem trade policy in equation (12a) equal to 
one.  In this case, political equilibrium production policy is the same as in the case where 
the government could also have chosen trade policy.9 
8 More generally, as discussed by Schleich and Orden, without externalities any two policies are a perfect 
substitute for the third.  It is straightforward to show that similar results hold when there is a consumption 
or production externality.  Thus, when good e causes a consumption externality, and when for some reason 
the government is unable to apply consumption and trade policies, it can achieve the same outcome using a 
combination of  production and trade policies.  Analogously, for a production externality the political 
equilibrium combination of  consumption and trade policies leads to the same domestic prices as production 
policy alone. 
9 For a closed economy, it can be shown that the political equilibrium production policy has the same 
structure as equation (13a).  Again, the equilibrium levels of  intervention will generally be different for the 
closed and open economies. 
19 Setting the ad valorem production policy in equation (12b) equal to one yields the 
political equilibrium when only trade policy is available 
(/  )  X  NuE',E'X'  (14)  (0.-1)=- iL-aL  i  -0  I 
I  (a+aL )  Pi
w M:  P;  M: 
The first term on the RHS of  (14) is the political support effect.  Again, it is identical to 
the Grossman-Helpman (1994) equilibrium policy and implies an import tariff or an 
export subsidy when an industry is organized.  For an industry creating an externality, the 
additional environmental effect requires either an import subsidy or an export tax, since 
these latter policies reduce domestic production and the externality. 
An interesting question in the context of  choice among policies when there is a 
production externality is whether the exclusive use of  either production policy or trade 
policy alone leads to higher prices for organized domestic producers, and thus to lower 
environmental quality.  On one hand, without the externality Schleich and Orden have 
shown that a production policy leads to a higher equilibrium output price than a trade 
policy because satisfying the special interest of  a particular lobby comes at less cost (no 
consumption distortion) to the other lobbies and total welfare.  On the other hand, if  there 
was no political support effect, because of  the consumption distortion associated with the 
trade policy, a Pigouvian production tax would lead to a lower producer price than a 
second-best import subsidy or export tax. 
Combining the two arguments, no general conclusion can be drawn as to whether 
the sole use of  production policy leads to a higher or lower domestic producer price than 
the sole use of  trade policy when there is a production externality.  In particular, it is 
possible either that trade policy leads to higher protection for the domestic industry than 
20 production policy, or that production policy alone protects the environment less than 
trade policy. 
Using equations (13a) and (14), together with the price equilibrium conditions, 
trade policy alone leads to the same domestic producer price as production policy alone 
(1  )X  Nu'E' 
when - - aLe  =  e  •  Thus, only when the political support effect exactly 
(a+aL)p;X:  p; 
equals the environmental effect--which implies that the equilibrium production and trade 
policies alone are zero--are the outcomes the same.  Production policy leads to a lower 
producer price and more environmental protection than trade policy only when the 
environmental effect is large compared to the political support effect.
to 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This paper characterizes the structure of  industry protection and environmental 
policy for a small open economy when the political equilibrium is derived as the outcome 
of  a noncooperative common agency game between organized industry lobbies and the 
government.  Extending the model proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1994), the 
political equilibrium policies are composed of  a political support effect and, when 
externalities are associated with the consumption or production of  one or more goods, an 
additional environmental effect.  Whether these two effects reinforce or counterbalance 
\0 For a consumption externality, there is a similar ambiguity: trade policy unambiguously leads to more 
protection of  an organized industry than consumption policy, but an import tariff or an export subsidy can 
lead to higher or lower environmental protection than the Pigouvian consumption tax. 
21 each other generally depends on the nature of  the externality, whether the industry is 
organized, and whether the good is exported or imported. 
For the case of  a consumption externality, when domestic and trade policies are 
available to the government, the political equilibrium results in production-enhancing 
protection of  organized industries, but the same level of  environmental protection as 
standard Pigouvian taxes.  This is not the case for a production externality because a 
domestic production policy not only serves the government to address the externality but 
(unlike the consumption policy) also to satisfy the lobbies.  If  an organized industry is a 
polluter, environmental protection is lower than under a standard Pigouvian production 
tax. 
Two important findings of  the analysis are that the Grossman-Helpman (1994) 
political equilibrium results are a special case (resting on the assumption that only trade 
policy is available to the government), and that it is generally ambiguous whether 
domestic policy or trade policy alone leads to higher or lower environmental protection. 
The latter result is demonstrated for the case of  a production externality.  A production 
subsidy incurs a lower deadweight loss than a trade policy for a given level of  support for 
an organized industry, but a production tax generates a lower deadweight loss than a trade 
policy for the same level of  environmental externality.  The relative outcomes from either 
policy alone for the domestic producer price, production, and the quality of  the 
environment depend on the magnitude of  the political support versus environmental 
impacts. 
22 In evaluating these results, the Grossman-Helpman model and its extension herein 
may appear restrictive because of  the underlying assumptions about production and 
preferences.  However, the basic conclusions drawn about the political equilibrium choice 
of  policies and their relative levels will hold for less restrictive specifications of supply 
and demand behavior.  The assumed structures are convenient because they facilitate the 
derivation of  explicit expressions for the equilibrium interventions, but comparable 
results can be derived for given parameterizations of  more general functional forms. 
The structure of  the model developed herein is also flexible enough to 
accommodate a variety of  modifications to provide further insight into the little-explored 
political economy of  trade and environmental policies.  For example, the production 
externality can be generated by an input instead of  an output, and the set of  available 
policies can include input taxes and subsidies.  Alternatively, organized environmental 
groups can compete with organized industries for environmental protection versus higher 
profits.  The political equilibrium policies under this latter scenario will reflect 
environmental concerns from the impact of  the environmental groups, even if  the 
government is concerned only about contributions and not at all about total welfare. 
In another dimension, the political equilibrium policies can be analyzed when 
countries are "large" and have international market power.  Similar to Grossman and 
Helpman (1995), when countries act unilaterally trade policy will generally be used to 
exploit a country's ability to affect its terms of  trade.  Domestic policies also affect the 
terms of  trade when countries are large, which has implications for the equilibrium policy 
outcome.  In particular, as shown by Schleich and Orden, when a country has market 
23 power it can use consumption policy to satisfy organized industries by raising the world 
price of  their outputs.  Thus in a large country model, the political equilibrium 
consumption policy will not be the Pigouvian tax even in the absence of  trade policy. 
In a large-country model, the environmental externalities can also be assumed to 
be either local or global.  The structure of  the equilibrium policies when governments 
cooperate on trade and/or domestic policies will be of  particular interest.  Cooperation 
among governments will parallel Grossman and Helpman's (1995) regime of  "trade 
talks" instead of  "trade wars."  Under a trade talks scenario, governments take into 
account the costs their policies impose on each other.  An interesting set of  results will 
emerge depending on whether international cooperation includes domestic policies or is 
limited to only trade policy. 
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27 LIST OF SYMBOLS 
N  population size 
I  total labor supply 
n  number of  nonnumeraire goods 
L  set of  organized industries 
world price for good i 
output price for good i 
consumption price for good i 
quasi-rents of  to the specific factor in industry i 
supply of  industry i 
X'  ,  derivative of  supply of  good i with respect to output price of  good i 
consumption of good i by individual j 
E  level of  environmental externality generated by the consumption of  good e 
by N -1  consumers (consumption externality) or by the production of  a 
good e (production externality) 
utility of  individual j 
subutility of  individual j derived from the consumption of  good i 
U~I  subutility of  individual j derived from the externality generated by 
all other individuals or the production of  a good e 
28 derivative of subutility derived from the externality with respect to 
the level of  the externality E 
individual demand for good i as a function of  the domestic consumer 
price for good i 
total domestic demand for good i 
D.' 
I  derivative of total domestic demand for good i with respect to the 
consumer price of  good i 
s  individual consumer surplus derived from the consumption of 
nonnumeraire goods can be expressed as 
v  individual's indirect utility 
y  individual income 
'tj  ad valorem tax or subsidy on consumption/production of  good i 
ad valorem tax or subsidy on imports or exports of  good i 
vector of  consumption/production taxes and subsidies 
e  vector of  import or export taxes and subsidies 
r  per-capita transfer of  government net revenue 
proposed contribution of  organized industry i to the government 
w  total consumer welfare 
G  government's welfare 
a  parameter that captures the trade-off between contributions 
and total welfare for the government. 
w;  gross welfare of  all members of  lobby i 
29 Ii  total labor supply of  all members of  lobby i 
gradient vector of  the partial derivative with respect to domestic 
and trade policies 
M'  ,  derivative of  domestic import demand for good i with respect to 
domestic price for good i 
indicator variable that takes on the value of 1  if  industry i is organized 
and zero if  the industry is not organized 
indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if  the consumption 
or production of  good i generates an environmental externality, and a 
value of  0 otherwise 
a L  share of  the population that owns specific factors in organized industries 
&  s  elasticity of  domestic output supply of  good i with respect to the price 
Xe,Pe 
of  good i 
30 